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PERFORMANCE OF THE LIVE CATTLE FUTURES CONTRACT: 
BASIS AND FORWARD-PRICING BEHAVIOR
Brian W. Barton and William G. Tomek
I. INTRODUCTION
This report is concerned with the performance of the futures market 
for live cattle contracts. There has been considerable discontent with 
trading in live and feeder cattle futures on the Chicago Mercantile Ex­
change (CME). Manipulation, concentration of market power and cash-futures 
prices schemes have been alleged (U.S. Congress 1980, page 1), and futures 
prices are thought to be biased and inefficient (Effertz and McDonald 1984).
Futures trading in any commodity is prone to attack when there is a 
protracted upward or downward trend in prices. Such trends inevitably 
benefit some market participants while wreaking havoc on others. The 
cattle market has been characterized by wide price swings, and the allega­
tions about the poor performance of this market may merely reflect dis­
content with these fundamental changes. But neither cash nor futures 
markets are perfect, and they can perform poorly. Thus, it is worthwhile 
to investigate market performance.
We first provide background information and then review the allegations 
and existing evidence about the performance of this market. The body of 
the report addresses two issues related to price behavior— the efficiency 
of prices over the life of the contract and basis behavior at contract 
maturity.
Market for Live Cattle Contracts
The market for futures contracts in live cattle opened on the CME in 
late 1964, with 1965 the first full year of trading. This contract calls 
for the delivery of choice (grain-fed) steers at various locations. The 
specific details of the contract have changed with the passage of time as 
the CME has attempted to improve it. The writing of a contract to make it 
a useful commercial vehicle is partly an art, and in 1964 exchanges had had 
little experience in writing contracts for perishable commodities.
Success of a futures market is commonly associated with volume of 
trading, and Working (1953) has argued that hedging use is essential to
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2the success of a futures market. In his view, volume cannot be built on 
speculative use alone, and hence volume has been taken as an indirect 
indicator of economic benefits of futures trading. In this sense, the 
cattle futures market has been successful. Annual volume has increased 
dramatically since 1965 (Table 1).
Table 1. Live cattle futures volume and open interest
Year
Annual
volume
Open interest 
June 30
1965 59
— 1,000 contracts---------------
4.0
1970 579 14.3
1975 2,457 37.4
1977 2,640 46.9
1978 5,040 74.9
1979 7,215 60.3
1980 5,997 59.2
1981 4,282 50.2
Source: Various CME Yearbooks.
Market participants can benefit from an increase in market liquidity. 
Telser (1981) has shown that historically each one percent increase in 
volume of trading is accompanied by a one-half percent decrease in the 
variability of prices. In an illiquid market, a single transaction can 
have a large price effect. In a liquid market, a large trade has little 
perceptible impact on futures prices. Thus, this transaction cost is 
small for hedgers and speculators. An increase in the volume of trading 
also implies that more information is entering the market.If Hence, 
pricing efficiency may improve as traders specialize and bring their 
knowledge to the market place.
Volume of trading statistics capture both hedging and speculative 
activities, and in order to get a clearer picture of hedging usage, both 
past and present, open interest data are shown in Table 1. Working (1953) 
conceptualized that a futures contractfs hedging use can be approximated
1/ However, it is quite possible that sortie traders bring little, and 
perhaps even erroneous, information to the market.
3by observing open interest. Open interest includes positions held by 
hedgers and interday speculators, but excludes the volume generated by 
intraday traders, which is largely speculative.^/
The data in Table 1 imply that hedging usage increased between the 
years 1965 and 1978. Between the years 1978 and 1981, however, open in­
terest declined by almost 33 percent; whereas annual volume of trading 
declined by only 15 percent. In order to further guage the hedging use 
of the live cattle contract, open interest can be compared to the number 
of cattle on feed, but this ratio overestimates hedging utilization be­
cause a significant proportion of open interest (the numerator) consists 
of interday speculative positions. In addition, there is the question of 
whether the cattle on feed number should include heifers, which cannot be 
delivered on the contract, but which could be cross hedged. During the 
decade of the 1970s, the ratio of steers on feed to open interest rose 
from a little over 8 to just over 36 percent._3/ Perhaps 18 percent or 
more of the total number of steers and heifers on feed in the U.S. were 
hedged in 1979.kj By 1981 this figure declined to 11 percent. Presumably, 
as the market developed, hedging use trended upward, but the level of 
hedging use also can vary with the expected returns from hedging.
The numbers in Table 2 indicate that short hedging prevails in the 
live cattle futures market. (A hedger who is short has sold futures con­
tracts anticipating a sale in the cash market.) This table is constructed 
to show the composition of large traders in live cattle futures. Over a 
twelve-year period, short hedging has been roughly four to seven times 
greater than long hedging.
The data in Table 2 indicate, however, that the market has not been 
overwhelmed by the trading activities of large traders, For instance, 
during the period 1977-1981 small traders, on average, held a larger per­
centage of long positions than did the large traders. Furthermore, if one 
looks at the proportion of open interest held by, say, the four largest 
traders short and long, the cattle market is not concentrated relative to 
the wheat and corn futures markets, at least in the mid-1970s (Paul et al. 
1981, p. 43).
2/ Scalpers, who provided liquidity, are an important component of intra 
day volume.
3/ Each live cattle contract is (roughly) equivalent to 37 live steers,
”  each weighing 1100 pounds. Hence, this ratio is constructed by first 
multiplying open interest (number of contracts) by 37 and then dividing 
by the number of steers on feed in the 23 major producing states.
4/ The 18 percent figure is consistent with the fact that 42 percent of 
the open interest during the period 1977-81 was short hedge positions 
held by large (reporting) traders (computed from CFTC commitments of 
traders data, see Table 2). However, large cattle feeders are not the 
only hedgers in the live cattle market; food retailers and small (non- 
reporting) traders, among others, also can hedge.
4Table 2. Distribution of open interest in live cattle futures on June 30
Reporting (large) traders^ Nonreporting
Speculative Hedging (small)
Year
Only
Long
Only
Short Spread Long Short
traders
Long Short
Percent hjof open interest—  -- —
1970 13.9 7.5 4.7 27.8 31.8 53.6 56.0
1975 22.4 3.7 4.7 6.2 42.5 66.4 48.8
1977 16.4 8.0 4.1 8.6 56.7 70.9 31.2
1978 22,3 7.0 12.5 8.4 44.4 56.9 36.1
1979 14.7 9.2 8.7 10.7 33.3 66.0 48.9
1980 22.8 7.2 8.5 6.1 33.3 62.6 51.0
1981 15.5 10.2 3.6 10.4 40.7 70.5 45.7
1977-81
Ave. 18.3 8.3 7.5 8.8 41.7 65.4 42.6
a/ Large traders, by definition have held 25, 50, or 100 open positions,
" over the years, at any one time. By definition, small traders hold less.
hi Sum of long positions plus spread equals 100, as does sum of short 
positions plus spread.
What explains the difference between the levels of short and long 
hedging? Presumably hedging in general is motivated by profitability and 
risk shifting. Paul and Wesson (1967) have shown that a positive relation­
ship exists between the price of feedlot services (defined by futures prices) 
and feedlot placements. Feedlot operators can sometimes assure a positive 
return to feedlot services via short hedges.5/ In contrast, little evidence 
exists about the lack of long hedging, but there is room to conjecture about 
why there is not more. The general issue is one of risk shifting and 
profitability and whether futures provides a relatively useful vehicle for 
commercial interests. Do profit opportunities exist for hedging or not? 
Perhaps no, but more likely they do. If so, then one is left with institu­
tional disincentives and lack of knowledge as possible explanations for 
the lack of long hedging. We consider each of these possibilities in 
further detail.
5/ Leuthold (1975) and Helmuth (1977) surveyed small feedlot operations and 
” found that only four to seven percent of them had previously used the 
live cattle contract. However, Helmuth did find this percentage to be 
much higher for the large feedlot operations.
5Under certain conditions it would seem logical for meat packers to 
have long hedges in the live cattle futures market. A meat packer might 
enter into a forward cash contract with a food retailer in a carlot carcass 
sale. Normally the time horizon for deferred delivery is within^a^year.
Unless the packer owns cattle in feedlots, he will have to buy finished 
steers at some later date. Between the time a contract is made and when 
the fed animals are purchased, the price of such animals may rise. In 
anticipation of future merchandising needs, the meat slaughterer may hedge 
in futures (Miller and Luke 1982).
Such anticipatory long hedging is common in the flour milling industry 
(Working 1970), but packers seldom use this type of hedge (McCoy 1979). 
Leuthold (1983) has conjectured that packers, "...can pass output^price 
risks on to consumers through the wholesale price structure. This would 
obviate the risk-shifting benefits associated with futures hedging. Helmuth 
(1981), on the other hand, believes that, "...it cannot be^expected that 
long hedging in live cattle futures will increase substantially until such 
times as significant amounts of beef are sold by packers on fixed-price 
forward contracts."
Institutional disincentives to long hedging may be caused by market 
inertia. Long before the live cattle futures market came into existence, 
the practice of short-term, directly-negotiated sales was (and is) widely 
used in the beef industry. Thus, institutional factors in the trade 
(direct marketing, formula pricing, etc.) stress short-term rather than 
long-term contractual commitments. Most food retailers purchase carcasses 
or boxed beef from packers on a formula or negotiated basis. And, delivery 
is usually made shortly after the sale. This procurement method is appealing 
to retailers because of its operational efficiency; great quantities of a 
standardized product can be acquired by a small staff of buyers a cost- 
effective mechanism.
Nevertheless, food retailers would be in the position to hedge (long) 
in futures during a retail meat sale campaign, or in conjunction with a 
forward cash purchase of wholesale meat during periods of rising prices 
(McCoy 1979). Tor example, Cornell University Dining Service frequently 
hedges in the live cattle market in anticipation of future needs. The 
high correlation between wholesale and live animal prices makes such 
hedging possible (Hayenga and DiPietre 1982). Though public information 
is scarce on the subject, it appears that few food retailers, restaurants, 
or fast-food chains hedge in futures.
Another hypothesis about the lack of long hedging is that there is 
generally a lack of experience in hedging in the retail industry. Grain 
merchants have had a far longer experience with hedging m  futures— over 
100 years. Perhaps long hedging will play a more important role as meat 
procurement practices become more sophisticated. In summary, institutions 
disincentives (i.e., relatively little output price level risks, direct 
marketing, etc.) and a lack of hedging experience appear to have held down 
the demand for long hedging in the live cattle futures market.
6Criticisms of the Cattle Market
Criticisms of the performance of the beef market have not been 
limited to trading in futures contracts. Concern has been expressed 
about formula pricing in wholesale carcass markets that rely on price 
quotes published in a proprietary publication which, in turn, depend on 
a small base of negotiated spot prices (USDA 1978). Economists have 
also wondered about the consequences of the decline in central markets 
for establishing live cattle prices (Tomek 1980). But this report is 
limited to an analysis of the performance of futures markets.
The criticisms of the cattle futures markets are summarized in an 
article by Helmuth (1981) and in the related reports of the House Committee 
on Small Business, which Helmuth cites (see also Gray and Rutledge 1971; 
Leuthold and Tomek 1980). One concern is the "imbalance" between short 
and long hedging, alluded to above. In Helmuth's view, supply fundamentals 
are expressed through short hedging, but demand fundamentals are not 
adequately reflected in the market, given the small amount of long hedg­
ing. "Such a situation is likely to result in systematic downward bias 
in prices" (p. 349).
Second, short hedging reflects the cost of feeding cattle relative 
to the current price of contracts for future delivery (the price of feed- 
lot services), and if large commercial feedlots have lower unit costs than 
smaller farmer-feeders, then these large feeders can lock in a profit 
through hedging at a lower futures price than can the small farmer. Thus, 
the short hedging of large feeders may prevent futures prices from rising 
to levels that would permit profitable hedging by smaller feeders. This 
observation about relative costs and prices, if true, is not a criticism 
of the market, but more a description of how competitive markets work.
Helmuth has suggested (p. 351), however, that hedging by large firms 
has been accompanied by large sales by officers of these firms— insider 
trading— that has depressed prices. In general, he argues that, when 
futures prices rise to profitable levels for commercial feedlots, this 
starts a chain of events which results in a predictable price decline.
Another concern, expressed when futures trading first started for 
live cattle, is that basis risk might exceed price level risk and, hence, 
that the cattle contract might have little value for hedging (Skadberg 
and Futrell 1967). The growth in hedging use implies that some commer­
cial interests have found the market to be valuable, but basis risk can 
vary among traders and relatively little attention has been paid to this 
question. As indicated earlier, few farmer-feeders do, in fact, use the 
cattle futures market, and Heinhold has testified (U.S. Congress 1982) 
that the volatility of futures prices discourages farmer use of futures.
According to recent research results (Hayenga, et al. 1983), a 
"typical" farmer-feeder in Iowa could have hedged to assure a positive 
return to cattle feeding in many extended time intervals, although in 
many other intervals hedging would not have been profitable, i.e., would 
have assured a negative margin. Thus, Helmuth-s concern about the level 
of futures prices relative to the typical farmer's costs appears exaggerated
7Nonetheless, the research results about possible bias in cattle
prices are definitely mixed (Kolb and Gay 1983; Koppenhaver 1983, Leuthold
1974; Martin and Garcia 1981).
In this context, our report concentrates on two issues of price J*” " 
formance: basis behavior at contract maturity and possible bias in future
prices over the life of a contract. The analysis of bases provides new 
evidence on a little researched topic, and in this sense is exploratory.
The results imply that the basis risk faced by cattle f“ R e s e a r c h  raises 
provides new insights into the nature of this risk. But the research ra 
as many questions as it answers, and clearly further analysis of basis be
havior is warranted.
Far more research has been done on the question of M as 
prices. Consequently, our research takes on a methodological flavor sug 
gesting why different methods and different sampie^periods can give d 
ferent results. We conclude on a rather pessimistic note about the poss
bility of existing methods, used with existing data, to
markets with "avoidable errors" which might be corrected and unavoidable 
errors" which are the typical outcome of an efficient market.
II. BASIS BEHAVIOR IN THE DELIVERY MONTH
The working hypothesis behind this section is that basis behavior, in 
the delivery month, is influenced by systematic and random J°ts! '’
including market imperfections that are reflected as lg normally
The mere presence of these factors suggests that bases are not normally
equal to zero in the delivery month.
Presumably hedgers have expectations about cash-futures price dif­
ferences (their basis). Hedgers participate in futures trading if b
risk is not too great. Otherwise, many will choose not to hedge 
futures; large imperfections (a delivery month squeeze) would weaken the 
institution of live cattle futures trading.
The major objective of this section is to evaluate using empirical 
analyses, basis risk for the live cattle contract at maturity. An att  V
is made to identify the presence of delivery m°n*  ' tut does
tice, this study identifies symptoms of unusual basis behavior,
not identify direct causes.
The first subsection 
both normal and anomalous 
work, the next subsection 
anomalously large bases. 
78 live cattle contracts, 
are discussed in light of
provides a conceptual framework for describing 
delivery month basis behavior. From this frame- 
develops an empirical criterion for identifying 
This criterion is then applied to a sample of 
In the last subsection, hedging implications 
empirical analyses.
Conceptual Framework
Thus
Basis
one
consists of a difference between a futures and cash price, 
basis may differ from another merely because the cash price
8differs. In addition, the cash price may not be pricing the identical 
product as in the contract delivery month. Thus, while most introductory 
textbooks make the simplifying assumption that basis is zero in the de­
livery month, one should expect cash-futures price differences throughout 
the delivery month, including the last trading day.
Bases vary through time, in part, because the economic forces deter­
mining prices change through time. Regional cash prices are affected by 
regional supplies and demands as well as any changes in transportation 
costs among regions. Since some latitude exists for changes in regional 
prices, relative to each other, the bases also can change. In addition, 
of course, these prices are influenced by random (nonsystematic) events, 
and part of the basis merely reflects differences in random events through 
time (see Leuthold, 1979, for a formal model of basis behavior).
Certain imperfections which prevent cash and futures prices from con­
verging at maturity, even at par delivery points, are basically due to the 
costs of making or taking delivery. Sometimes it is cheaper for a seller 
of futures to offset the futures position at a futures premium over the 
apparent spot market than it is to make delivery (or vice versa for the 
buyer of futures).j>/ To some degree these may be correctable errors but 
it is not possible to write the perfect contract that can anticipate all 
situations. It may, for example, be desirable to have a variety of delivery 
points specified in the contract (to limit squeeze potential), but the 
diversity of delivery points creates uncertainty among buyers about where 
delivery will occur and raises issues about the amount, if any, of price 
differentials among delivery points. In other words, contract writing is 
an art and involves compromises. Thus, even with the best of efforts, some 
relatively large bases are likely to occur.
The rest of this section describes imperfections that can influence 
the maturity month basis. This is in contrast to a perfect market, where 
transaction costs are zero and cash and live cattle futures price series 
will converge to an identical value by the 20th day of the maturing con­
tract month.7/ Under this paradigm, delivery date is known by all parties;
6/ For instance, the number of deliveries made on the live cattle contract 
increased substantially from previous years’ levels during the latter 
part of 1973 and first part of 1974. This can be attributed, in large 
part, to the (red meat) wage and price controls put into effect for 
two months beginning June 13, 1973 (Hall et al. 1981). A large number 
of feedlot operators, in anticipation of a quick end to these price 
controls, held overweight cattle off the market. Hedgers found that 
futures overpriced heavy steers relative to cash. This situation en­
couraged deliveries. If the live cattle contract had assessed a 
greater penalty for heavy cattle, then deliveries during this time 
period might have been smaller.
7/ For example, suppose that a cash commodity in the delivery month is 
~" selling at a price under its futures market quote. This price relation­
ship encourages (futures market) speculators to buy the cash commodity 
and sell its future. Then, to fulfill their contractual obligation,
9the quality of animals is known prior to delivery; handling and trans 
portation costs associated with delivery are zero; actual delivery l o t i o n  
is known by all contracting parties; and transaction costs associated with 
arbitrage are zero.
These assumptions oversimplify actual practice. Delivery in the 
maturity month is made at the seller’s pleasure, and the precise^quality 
of animals delivered cannot be determined until actual delivery is made.
Animals shipped by the seller to a par delivery market may not satisfy 
par delivery unit requirements, i.e., grades, weight, hot yield require 
ments, health, lack of dairy characteristics, etc.8/ Even if an accept­
able "par delivery unit" of choice steers were loaded onto a truck, live 
animals can deteriorate while in transit. The contract has provisions for 
assessing price penalties to sellers in these instances, and sellers may 
try to avoid delivery risks by liquidating their futures positions before 
the last day of active trading. Such action puts upward pressure on 
futures prices.
Like sellers, buyers of futures contemplating delivery face uncer^ 
tainties. The animals delivered to merchandisers (buyers) may be unsuited 
for their particular needs. Buyers also face risk when animals are kept n 
a holding pen at a delivery point for too long a time period. Animal de 
terioration is a problem in such cases. In the end, buyers may wis ° 
avoid taking delivery. Instead of accepting deliveries, they could^purchase 
cattle in spot markets in order to satisfy their merchandising requirements.
The live cattle contract has seven par delivery points: Peoria,
Illinois; Joliet, Illinois; Omaha, Nebraska; Sioux City, Iowa; Guymon, 
Oklahoma; and Greeley, Colorado. Buyers may be uncertain about where the 
cattle will be delivered. Presumably merchandisers prefer to obtain their 
supply of cattle at some convenient spot market; whereas the delivery o 
cattle may be at any one of seven locations.
The general principle behind delivery, including the location,^is that 
sellers will deliver at the par delivery point that is least expensive for 
them while still satisfying the terms of the futures contract. ow cos 
choices may differ for various sellers, and the buyer will be uncer a n 
about the particular delivery notice that will be received.
these speculators deliver the purchased cash commodity to allocation 
specified in the (future) contract. Assuming zero transaction costs, 
these speculators reap a profit by making such transactions; their reward 
Is equal to the difference between the cash and future price multiplied 
bv the (physical) volume of the commodity bought or sold. (If cash is 
above its future, speculators could make a profit if they sell the cash 
commodity and buy its future.) In the end, this uneven price ^ t i o n  
ship extinguishes itself; buying raises the cash price, and se g 
the future price until there is no longer a discrepancy between the two.
8/ The text covers conditions as they were. Under a recent contract re-
vision, a certificate delivery system became effective m  December 1983. 
Opinion is divided about the effect of the new system on the basis at 
maturity (Abbott 1984).
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In addition, there are out-of-pocket expenses associated with de­
liveries. Sellers must shoulder the bill for all yardage costs (i.e., 
bedding, feeding, insurance, grading, documental, etc.) up to and in­
cluding weighing at the delivery point. They must also transport the 
animals to a par delivery point at their own expense. If such costs are 
substantial, sellers may prefer to avoid delivery by offsetting futures 
positions.
Buyers must pay all yardage costs after the animals are weighed at 
the delivery point. Buyers may face substantial handling costs if de­
livered animals remain in a holding pen at a delivery point for too long 
a time period. Also, transporting the delivered animals to a processing 
(e.g., packing) plant is an added expense. Thus, the cash commodity is 
worth more to buyers than the futures commodity.
Also, there are explicit costs associated with futures market usage, 
such as commissions. Therefore, on the last trading day the effective 
futures price is equal to the nominal price less any arbitrage costs. The 
effective futures price may be less than the cash price.
It is plausible to think of a "squeeze'* as an extension of the non­
zero bases concept (Paul 1976). That is, the delivery-month squeeze can 
be thought of as large nonzero bases caused by unusually high, and unantici 
pated, delivery costs. The futures price is "out of line" with spot prices 
A squeeze usually affects the entire family of bases (pertaining to a 
particular contract) and not a subset of that group.
An undesirable basis likely can be avoided by hedgers, if it is the 
result of a particular cash price. In this case, hedgers have the option 
to sell their finished steers in an alternative, nearby cash market with a 
more favorable basis. However, hedgers would not have this option in 
event of a delivery month squeeze, since futures tend to be out of line 
with all cash prices.
The extent of a squeeze tends to be limited by the size of "unusual" 
delivery costs. Hence, it is an empirical question as to whether excessive 
delivery costs have occurred in the past. The next subsection sets about 
building the analysis that will, hopefully, identify past "squeezes."
Data and Methods
Price data were obtained for each business day for five spot markets: 
Interior Iowa; Sioux City, Iowa; Omaha, Nebraska; East St. Louis, Illinois 
and Peoria, Illinois. All prices are in nominal terms and on a per hundred 
weight (cwt) scale. Hence, the computed bases are in dollars per cwt.
The February, April, June, August, October, and December futures contracts 
are represented in the data set.9/ In total, 30 (5 cash markets x 6 con­
tracts) maturity month bases are calculated for each year.
9/ The data set used in this report consists of cash and futures prices 
collected by the Department of Economics, Iowa State University 
(DiPietre 1982).
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The midpoint of the daily high and low spot market prices is used 
for each location, and for the sake of consistency, the midpoint of the 
daily high and low futures price is also. used. Bases were computed by 
subtracting cash prices from futures prices.
A simple average of the daily bases was computed for each maturity 
month for each market. Sometimes, when the volume of trading in a cash 
market was sparse, a cash price was not reported for that trading day.
Thus, the monthly average is based on the number of days for which ob­
servations are available. In addition, global averages are computed over 
the sample years for each market and contract month.
A potential problem with the basis data is the uniformity of cash 
prices during the latter part of the business week. The volume of trading 
in the cash markets is largest on Monday, and tapers off by week's end.
As a result, the cash market may merely reflect Tuesday's or Wednesday s 
price on Thursday and Friday. If futures prices continue to change during 
these days, while cash prices remain at nominal levels, end-of-the-week 
bases could be relatively more variable than beginning-of-the-week bases. 
Unfortunately, this problem, if indeed it is a problem, cannot be easily 
solved. Part of the analysis involves daily bases, as well as averages, 
and it is useful to have the daily observations available.
Prices in the data base start with the first trading day of 1969 and 
end on the last day in 1981.10/ During the time period, 78 live cattle 
contracts were traded. The choice of starting the sample period in 1969 
was rather arbitrary. Futures markets do not always work well in their^ 
infancy (Tomek 1979-1980) and years with small volume are not included in
the analysis.
For purposes of this appraisal, no attempt is made to develop a model 
to explain year-to-year variability of the basis. Rather, the variability o 
each monthly basis is examined relative to its global mean. For example, the 
five bases for February 1969 delivery are compared with^their respective 
average bases derived from the full time period. In this study, normal 
basis behavior" is defined as: any basis that is not more than one standard
deviation (plus or minus) from its interyear average.ll/ With this rule of 
thumb, developing a criterion for identifying a possible squeeze is made 
easier.
The following criterion is used for identifying possible squeezes: 
if at least four of the five bases in a particular delivery month deviate 
(in the same direction) from their interyear average by^one^interyear 
standard deviation, then this month is defined as experiencing a squeeze.
10/ Because of the availability of the data, a simple average of the daily 
bases was computed for the February 1982 and April 1982 contracts. 
While the bases associated with these two contracts were not part of 
the sample analyzed, they were used (to increase the sample size) to 
calculate interyear means (arithmetic and trend).
11/ Admittedly, one standard deviation is an arbitrary number. For pur- 
poses of identifying aberrations, however, this choice appears to be 
reasonable, as will be seen later.
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This criterion assumes that, if the bases for four or more cash markets 
are simultaneously wide (or narrow) relative to their respective norms, 
then the problem likely lies with the futures quotation. On the other 
hand, when only one basis is out of line with the norm, this is more 
likely related to the local cash price quotation than to a problem in 
futures. In fact, isolated cases of an anomalous basis should be expected. 
Bases should and do vary, and if a basis, say for Omaha, is normally dis­
tributed, then 32 percent of the observations should be greater or smaller 
than plus or minus one standard deviation from its interyear average. But 
it is less likely that four or five bases would randomly wander more than 
one standard deviation in the same direction from their respective his­
torical means in the same contract month. In this sense, the criterion 
just described is a rigorous one.
The nominal bases are not deflated because the criterion is a relative 
one. However, in order to adjust for possible systematic changes in bases, 
a trend equation is fitted separately for each basis, using Ordinary Least 
Squares regression (OLS), by contract month and market over the sample 
years. Also, the bases are graphed against time, by contract and by mar­
ket, showing interyear basis behavior at maturity. Then, a judgment is 
made about whether "significant'1 trends exist by month. Given the OLS 
equations and visual examination of the graphs, does the basis appear to 
be trending upward? It would be preferable to use either five trend 
equations or five arithmetic means for each month: if a mixture is used,
it will be based on logical grounds.
Those contracts identified as squeeze candidates are then subjected 
to supplementary analysis. During the life of a contract, open interest 
gradually builds to a peak and then declines to zero by the final day of 
the delivery month. Open Interest is reduced as traders buy or sell con­
tracts until their net position in a particular contract is zero, or as 
traders make or take delivery of the physical commodity. There are times, 
however, when open interest is relatively large at the beginning of a 
delivery month. Then, the market must liquidate these open positions 
rather quickly, and this may result in more (contract) deliveries being 
made than usual. It has been hypothesized that large deliveries, relative 
to open interest, are a by-product of a delivery month squeeze (Paul 1976). 
Large deliveries relative to open interest may be a sign of a problem.
For those contracts identified as having apparent squeeze problems, 
it would be useful to know whether the basis was unusually large at the 
beginning or end of the delivery month or both. If an unusually large 
basis occurred only in the last few days of the delivery month, then those 
hedgers who offset their futures positions prior to the terminal month 
avoided substantial basis risk. However, if an anomalous basis manifested 
itself prior to the delivery month, then such evasive action may have been 
ineffective.
In order to study intramonth basis variability, the ratio of average 
of futures prices observed during the first five days of the month to the 
average of futures prices during the last three days of the month is computed;
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a similar ratio also is computed for the bases of selected markets .1_2/ 
In addition, the standard deviation of the daily bases is estimated for 
these months.
Empirical Results
Interyear basis behavior is described by interyear mean and standard 
deviation statistics shown in Table 3. 13/ Presumably all bases tend to 
be positioned around their historical mean. For example, one would expect 
that Omaha basis for the 1976 February contract to be somewhere near $0.84 
per cwt (the February contract's mean for the sample period) plus of 
minus another 74 cents per cwt (the contract's standard deviation)-14/ The 
$0.74 per cwt measures random events specific to the Omaha basis for the 
February contract. The same principle is applied to means estimated from 
trend analysis.
12/ The five-day mean merely is the average futures price for the first 
full week of trading. The three-day mean also is arbitrary, but if 
the basis was to widen near the end of the contract's life, the last 
three days of (futures) trading should capture the change.
13/ Trend equations were fitted for each basis and the results are
shown in Appendix A, Some of these equations appear in Table 3. An 
effort was made to use either five trend equations or five global 
means when applying the squeeze criterion. For instance, only one 
February basis (i.e., Interior Iowa) appears to have followed a sig­
nificant trend over the sample years, i.e., over a 13-year period.
But for consistency and given the fact that this basis experienced a 
negative trend, the decision was made to use its (arithmetic) global 
mean in Table 3 and, hence, in the analysis. On the other hand, the 
Interior Iowa basis was the only one associated with the April con­
tract that did not follow an upward trend over the sample years.
Thus, to be consistent, its trend equation is used. The results from 
the trend analysis for the June, August, October, and December bases 
were mixed. The East St. Louis and Peoria bases appear to have fol­
lowed an upward trend over the sample years for each of these^four 
contracts. Thus, it was decided to only use the East St. Louis and 
Peoria trend equations (for these four contracts).
14/ The interyear standard, deviation statistic is used for measuring 
basis variability. The coefficient of variation statistic, an 
alternative measure of variability, is not very useful since many 
bases are close to zero in value, and therefore, the coefficient of 
variation can be huge.
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Table 3. Interyear means and standard deviations for bases in five 
maikets ($/cwt)
a / T bjDelivery Interyear- Interyear—
Market Month Mean Std. Dev.
Interior Iowa (1) Eeb. $0.88 $0.72
Sioux City (2) Feb. 1.04 0.73
Omaha (3) Feb. 0.84 0.74
"East St. Louis (4) Feb. 0.96 1.00
Peoria (5) Feb. 0.26 0.65
(1) Apr. 1.07 + 0.03 (TRD)— ^ 0.68
(2) Apr. 0.74 + 0.07 (TRD) 0.50
(3) Apr. 0.36 + 0.15 (TRD) 1.08
(4) Apr. 0.39 + 0.20 (TRD) 1.13
(5) Apr. -0.44 + 0.22 (TRD) 0.96
(1) June 0.79 0.73
(2) June 0.63 0.85
(3) June 0.66 0.73
(4) June 0.49 + 0.17 (TRD) 1.07
(5) June -0.24 + 0.16 (TRD) 0.91
(1) Aug. 0.69 1.06
(2) Aug. 0.64 2.07
(3) Aug. 0.23 1.13
(4) Aug. 0.20 + 0.14 (TRD) 0.80
(5) Aug. -0.24 + 0.11 (TRD) 1.23
(1) Oct. 0.65 0.66
(2) Oct. 0.64 0.68
(3) Oct. 0.44 0.68
(4) Oct. -0.37 + 0.13 (TRD) 0.66
(5) Oct. -1.04 + 0.17 (TRD) 0.98
(1) Dec. 1.41 0.70
(2) Dec. 1.46 0.59
(3) Dec. 1.24 0.61
(4) Dec. 0.75 + 0.16 (TRD) 1.10
(5) Dec. 0.24 + 0.14 (TRD) 0.69
aj Arithmetic or trend mean.
b/ Standard deviation of variable or of error term of trend regression, 
c/ Trend variable, 1969 = 0; 1970 — 1; ••• 1981 - 12.
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To summarize the results in Table 3, 13 out of 30 interyear bases 
grew "significantly" larger with the passage of time, furthermore, except 
for February, the easternmost bases (Peoria and East St. Louis) trended 
upward between 1969 and 1981, while the other bases did not (with the ex­
ception of the April contract). These trends perhaps reflect regional 
shifts in supplies, but as indicated earlier, structural econometric 
analysis of basis behavior is beyond the scope of this research.
Table 4 was constructed to summarize the change in the monthly basis 
pattern observed in 1981 from the pattern observed in 1969. This table 
clearly shows that the East St. Louis and Peoria bases have risen, over 
time, relative to the other markets, i.e., Interior Iowa, Sioux City, and 
Omaha. Also, the December basis was, and remains, relatively large com­
pared to the other maturities. Furthermore, the trend analysis implies 
that the April basis has. tended to increase relative to^the other contract 
months for all markets. Not much can be said about basis variability, 
although the East St. Louis market usually had the largest variability.
The information in Table 3 can be used for identifying potential^ 
delivery month squeezes, using the criterion defined above. To he^P 
trate how this rule is used, several examples are worked out m  Table 5.
Table 4. Kean bases in 1969 and 1981 ($/cwt)
Market Feb. Apr. June Aug. Oct. Dec.
(a) 1969 Bases
Interior Iowa (1) 0.88 1.07 0.79 0.69 0.65 1.41
Sioux City (2) 0.04 0.74 0.63 0.64 0.64 1.46
Omaha (3) 0.84 0.36 0.66 0.23 0.44 1.24
East St. Louis (4) 0.96 0.39 0.49 0.20 -0.57 0.75
Peoria (5) 0.26 -0.44 -0.24 -0.24 -1.04 0.24
Mean basis for contract 0.60 0.42 0.47 0.30 0.02 1.02
(b) 1981 Bases
Interior Iowa (1) 0.88 1.43 0.79 0.69 0.65 1.41
Sioux City (2) 0.04 1.58 0.63 0.64 0.64 1.46
Omaha (3) 0.84 2.16 0.66 0.23 0.44 1.24
East St. Louis (4) 0.96 2.79 2.53 1.88 0.99 2.67
Peoria (5) 0.26 2.20 1.68 1.08 1.00 1.92
Mean basis for contract 0.60 2.03 1.26 0.90 0.74 1.74
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Table 5. Normal versus wide bases for the June contract, selected years
Interyear Individual Difference
Market Year Mean (X) Mean, X - X.l
------$/cwt---—
Interior Iowa (1) 1973 0.79 0.65 0.14
Sioux City (2) 1973 0.63 0.61 0.02
Omaha (3) 1973 0.66 , 
i . i ? y
0 . 4 0 ^
0.64 0.02
East St. Louis (4) 1973 1.09 0.08
Peoria (5) 1973 0.56 -0.16
(1) 1974 0.79 -0.82 1.61
(2) 1974 0.63 -0.79 1.42
(3)
(4)
1974
1974
0.66 , 
1 . 3 4 ^  
0 . 56— ;
-0.27
-0.98
0.93
2.32
(5) 1974 -0.96 1.52
(1) 1975 0.79 1.16 -0.37
(2) 1975 0.63 0.22 0.41
(3) 1975 0.66 , 
1 .51— /
0.7 2—
0.72 -0.06
(4) ' 1975 3.11 -1.60
(5) 1975 0.64 0.08
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
1976 0.79 2.07 -1.28
1976 0.63 2.13 -1.50
1976 0.66 , 
1.68^ 
0.88^
1.84 -1.18
1976 2.93 -1.25
1976 2.61 -1.73
a/ Computed from trend (see Table 3).
This table reports data collected for each June basis for the years 1973 
through 1976. The columns contain information about the basis in a particular 
market: interyear mean, individual mean, and the differences. The inter-
year mean is computed for the entire sample of months of June; individual 
means are merely average bases for the June contract in particular years for 
each market.
The criterion suggests that the 1974 and 1976 June contracts may have 
experienced abnormal bases or "squeezes." All five June bases in both years 
fell outside the range of plus or minus one standard deviation. In par­
ticular, the five bases associated with the 1974 contract fell below the 
range, while those associated with the 1976 contract all fell at the other 
end of the spectrum. Furthermore, most of the differences approached, or 
surpassed, an absolute value of one dollar per hundredweight for these two 
contracts.
To visualize these two situations, refer to Figure 1. Selected June 
bases, which represent the behavior in the five markets, are plotted over 
the 13-year sample period. In 1974, all bases systematically dropped from
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FIGURE I. H ISTORICAL JUNE BASES
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Year
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1973 levels. In fact, futures prices were so depressed that choice steer 
prices in the cash market were higher than futures. Conversely, in 1976, 
sellers were apparently forced to liquidate (buy) positions at relatively 
inflated prices.
Examples of "normal" basis behavior can be found in the 1975 and 1973 
June contracts (see again, Table 5). With one exception, all of the indi­
vidual bases were positioned within the range of one standard deviation. 
Furthermore, most of the residuals associated with these bases were less 
than one dollar per hundredweight.
The East St. Louis basis, however, was large (and positive) in 1975.
The fact that one basis out of five is unusually large suggests that the 
problem lies with the cash market, not the futures market. Presumably 
hedgers in this market could have sold their cattle in an alternative 
(nearby) cash market in order to lift the hedge at a relatively favorable 
basis.
The East St. Louis basis is generally larger than the rest (Figure 1).
In addition, as observed previously, the East St. Louis basis is more 
variable than those for the other markets. This relatively variable basis 
perhaps reflects a cash market that is not working well. Cattle feeders 
selling in this market face greater basis risk and would find hedging, 
using these spot prices, relatively unattractive.
After applying the criterion to the entire data set, 14 of 78 con­
tracts were identified as possible squeeze candidates, although short 
hedgers would have benefited from relatively small bases in 10 of these 
contracts. In other words, approximately 18 percent of all contracts 
traded in a thirteen-year period had bases that were unusually large in 
absolute value, but in many cases such bases were negative, favoring the 
short hedger.
Turning to the supplementary evidence, peak open interest and deliveries 
are shown in Table 6 for each contract identified by the squeeze criterion.
A ratio was constructed by dividing the total number of deliveries on each 
contract by that contract's peak open interest. Of the 14 contracts listed 
in the table, only 5 have a ratio greater than 5 percent. That is, only 
5 contracts with anomalous bases experienced large deliveries, as defined 
by a simple rule of thumb. There were, however, 7 other months of rela­
tively large deliveries, but "normal" basis behavior.
Table 7 summarizes the nature of deliveries and bases for the 78 
maturities under study. This table clearly shows that the interrelation­
ship between "large" bases and "large".deliveries is rather weak, i.e., 
only 5/78 of the contracts fell in this category. This (weak) relation­
ship is contrary to the one hypothesized above.
The intramonth character of those 14 contracts previously identified 
as squeeze candidates is described in Tables 8 and 9. Clearly, the ratios 
of futures prices lie near one. The level of futures prices changed rela­
tively little from the beginning to the end of these months, and in this 
sense, the anomalous basis behavior does not appear to be related to 
dramatic changes in futures prices near the end of the life of the contract.
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Table 6. Deliveries as a percentage of peak open interest for contracts 
with four or five anomalous bases
Contract
Five Large Bases—
April 1973 
February 1974 
June 1974 
August 1975 
October 1975 
February 1976 
June 1976 
June 1978 
October_1981_____
Four Large Bases
August 1973 
December 1973 
August 1978 
December 1978 
April 1980
(1) a / No. of—
deliveries
(2) a / Max. open-
interest
Ratio 
(1)/(2)
%COutiaCLb1 '
96 18,492 0.52
504 8,877 5.68
423 11,781 3.59
81 19,022 0.43
149 12,092 1.23
81 17,160 0.47
1,517 15,068 10.01
307 27,407 1.12
831 24,762 3.36
823 7,526 11.00
1,238 10,998 11.26
343 24,824 1.38
1,657 29,976 5.53
572 29,794 1.96
a/ Data from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Yearbook, various issues, 
b/ Bases large in absolute value relative to the mean— see text.
Table 7. Relationship between bases and deliveries (frequencies)
Deliveries
Large Small Sum
B Largeci 5
9 14
s
6 Small 7 57 64s
12 66 78
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Table 8. Ratio of beginning of month to ending of month futures prices 
for contracts with large bases
Contract
First five^ Last three^1 5 day mean
day mean_________ day mean______3 day mean
---------$ per cwt-----------
April 1973 43.91 45.45 0.97
June 1974 36.93 38.48 0.96
All August 1975 44.92 47.49 0.95
have October 1975 48.71 47.16 1.03five
anomalous
bases February 1976 38,24 38.96 0.98
June 1976 43.85 41.02 1.07
June 1978 58.75 55.62 1.06
October 1981 65.02 63.84 1.02
August 1973 56.03 55.34 1.01
All December 1973 38.09 40.70 0:94
have
four August 1978 52.25 51.39 1.02
anomalous
bases December 1978 56.97 57.83 0.99
April 1980 60,93 65.27 0.94
a/ Means calculated using average of the daily high and low futures
prices.
21
Table 9. Intramonth descriptive statistics for bases
1
Delivery month market
monthly
mean
ratio of , , ., a/ daxly means—
s t . dev. 
daily basis
April 1973 (1) -0.27 -1.35 0.751
(2) 0.20
0.538(3) -0.51 -4.88
(4) -0.76 -3.60 1.063
(5) -1.72
Augus t 1973 (1) 2.88 1.76 0.985
(2) 2.08
0.641(3) 2.49 1.83
(4) 1.26 5.39 1.074
(5) 1.70
December 1973 (1) 0.47 0.58 0.773
(2) 0.69 0.961(3) 0.70 0.68
(4) -0.79 4.12 1.241
(5) -0.71
February 1974 (1) 0.07 -0.72 0.487
(2) 0.24 0.628(3) -0.46 -0.05
(4) -1.50 0.45 1.151
(5) -0.95
June 1974 (1) -0.89 1.45 0.904
(2) -0.79 1.212(3) -0.29 -0.88
(4) -0.98 1.13 0.839
(5) -0.96
August 1975 (1) -1.47 21.80 1.420
(2) -2.27
(3) -1.80 25.36 1.533
(4) 0.07 -  b/ 1.660
(5) -2.12
October 1975 (1) -0.51 -0.26 0.752
(2) -0.95 0.454(3) -1.11 1.48
(4) -1.04 — ‘
(5) -2.52
February 1976 C D 0.05 -0.75 0.642
(2) -0.10 0.481(3) -0.19 -2.61
(4) -0.74 — 0.816
(5) -0.66
June 1976 (1) 2.07 3.97 1.056
(2) 2.13 0.954(3) 1.84 3.41
(4) 2.93 2.51 1.220
(5) 2.61
(continued)
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Table 9 (eont i nuod)
Delivery month market
monthly
mean
ratio of , j t a / daily means— s t. dev. daily basis
June 1978 (1) -Q. 28 0.33 0.986
(2) -0.58
(3) -0.52 -0.48 0.966
(4) 0.93 0.78 0.989
(5) -0.48
August 1978 (1) -0.48 -1.54 0.893
(2) -0.68
(3) -1.06 -4.26 1.077
(4) 0.04 — 0.326
(5) -0.63
December 1978 (1) 2,22 1.16 0.322
(2) 2.07
(3) 1.84 1.24 0.332
(4) 3.73 0.92 0.509
(5) 2.00
April 1980 (1) 0.70 -0.14 0.887
(2) 1.27
(3) 0.84 -0.47 1.840
(4) 0.86 — 1.458
(5) 1.00
October 1981 (1) 1.44 0.38 0.647
(2) 2.03
(3) 1.63 0.62 0.507
(4) 1.63 0.32 1.069
(5) 2.04
a/ Ratio of average basis in first five days to last three days. A
negative sign shows a change of sign in basis during the month
b/ —  indicates that an inadequate number of observations existed for 
—  computing the three and/or five day mean. The ratios were not computed 
for markets (2) and (5).
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Nonetheless, the bases are highly variable; the standard deviations 
of the daily bases (last column Table 9) are large relative to their re­
spective means. But this appears to be true in all maturity months, not 
just those with "squeezes,” although these months seem to have somewhat 
larger daily variation than the normal months (compare results for the 
June contract in Table 10). Consistent with earlier results, the basis^ 
for East St. Louis (market (A)) is typically more variable than the basis 
in Omaha (market (3)).
It is difficult to generalize about "trends" in the daily basis during 
those maturity months that had abnormally large or small bases on average. 
The ratios of the average basis for the first five days of the month to the 
last three days of the month are diverse. The negative signs indicate 
those months when the basis moved from negative to positive or from posi­
tive to negative as maturity approached; this occurred in at least some^ 
markets in eight of the 14 months. Ratios different than one reflect dif­
ferences in the beginning and ending means of the bases; the ratios ranged 
from about -5 to 25.
These statistics combined with a visual inspection of the daily data 
suggest two things. First, the daily basis typically is highly variable 
in those months with abnormal means and the basis in the last three days 
can be quite different than earlier in the month. Second, however, abnormal 
behavior is observable throughout the maturity month, and the unusual means 
typically are not just a function of the last three days of trading. These 
results certainly have implications for the successful completion of hedges.
Hedging Implications and Conclusion
The effectiveness of the live cattle contract, as a hedging tool, is 
limited by basis volatility. The standard deviations are often^a large pro­
portion of the average bases. For example, the standard deviation of the 
Interior Iowa basis in June was 94 percent of the average basis during the 
sample period (Table 3). An unpredictable delivery month basis may dis­
courage some potential hedgers from using live cattle futures. This is 
because hedgers are unable to consistently "lock in' a known return;for 
their feedlot services.
The nature of basis instability is highlighted in Table 10; this table 
shows descriptive statistics for the Interior Iowa basis in June, a contract 
that might be used by a farmer-feeder. The standard deviations associated 
with the individual means are a measure of the daily variability of the 
basis, which is often substantial. The overall standard deviation shows 
the variability of the monthly means about the 13-year average, and as in­
dicated above, the coefficient of variation is .94, indicating relatively 
large variability. Three of the months— 1974, 1976 and 1978— appear to be 
characterized by aberrant futures behavior relative to cash prices. If 
these three years are deleted, the average basis is $0.93 and the standard 
deviation a more modest $0.30 per cwt.
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics for Interior Iowa basis for live cattle 
in June maturity month
Year _______________ . _______ Mean__________ ______________St. Dev.
--------- .----$ per cwt------------
1969 0.415 0.40#'
1970 1.376 0.355
1971 0.744 0.236
1972 0.758 0.205
1973 0.651 0.164
1974
c /
-0.891- 0.904
1975 1.162 0.871
1976 2.07 1.056
1977 0.850 0.474
1978 -0.276^ 0.986
1979 1.239 0.795
1980 1.160 0.566
1981 0.952 0.927
Overall 0.79 0.7 4— ^
a/ Based on variability of daily base about monthly mean.
b/ Based on variability of monthly means about 13 year average. (Result 
differs slightly from Table 3 due to rounding.) The annual standard 
deviation is used for squeeze criterion.
c/ Month identified as an aberration or "squeeze." If these months are 
excluded, then the standard deviation is 0.30 and the mean 0.93 for 
the 10 year sample.
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A short hedger can benefits, as well as suffer, from a squeeze. When 
the basis is unexpectedly narrow, the net return from the combined futures 
and spot transactions is greater than the amount expected using the average 
basis. For example, the June contract's price on January 15, 1974 was 
$54.65 per cwt. If the expected June basis were $1.00 per cwt for Interior 
Iowa, points,15/ then the expected return from the hedge for these farmers 
would have been $53.65. In retrospect, this contract appears to have had 
a much smaller basis than expected. Thus, if an Iowa hedger had sold 
futures on January 15 and lifted his hedge on the first Monday in June 
with a basis that day of $-1.20 per cwt, the price obtained by the hedge 
was actually $55.85 per cwt, or $2.20 more than expected.
Conversely, long hedgers, facing a similar basis relationship, would 
be harmed. In addition, the unexpected return from an individual favorable 
basis does not obviate the general erratic nature of the cattle basis. A 
risk—averse hedger would be concerned about the unexplainable variability 
of the basis and hence in the returns from hedging.
If a cattle feeder had routinely hedged in the June contract in 
January selling the cattle and lifting the hedge on the first Monday in 
June, the average return would have been $44,76 with a standard deviation 
of $15.42 per cwt for the entire 13 years. In contrast, the unhedged cash 
sale would have provided a return of $46.59 with a standard deviation of 
$13.66. Thus, routine hedging would have penalized the feeder both in 
terms of average returns and the variability of returns.16/
The effects of an anomalous basis on the farmer-feeder's income are 
potentially more dramatic than on the large feedlot-operator's income. The 
farmer—feeder only uses one or two contracts per year for hedging.17/ On
15/ The average June basis was $0.79 for the sample period and $0.93 omitting 
three aberrant observations. The $1.00 basis used in the calculations 
is a convenient, conservative estimate.
16/ The hedge is assumed to have been placed by a sale of June futures on
January 15 and held 5 1/2 months. Prices rose in eight of the 13 years; 
thus, the loss in futures over this sample period reduced net returns.
If appraised in terms of achieving a target price, however, the perfor­
mance is somewhat better. A conservative view would have been to treat 
Interior Iowa cash prices as being about one dollar below futures during 
the maturity month, and since the June futures averaged $45,46 on ^
January 15, this implies that a hedge on that day would have "locked in" 
an expected return of $44.46 per cwt. The actual net was $44.76. As 
explained in the text, several of the aberrations involved futures that 
were unusually low relative to the cash prices.
17/ Farmer-feeders often follow a fixed feeding regime. They place feeder 
animals on a concentrated grain ration in the winter after the cattle 
have been grazed in the summer and fed roughage in the fall. Under 
this regime, feeder animals reach market weight by the next summer.
Hence, farmer-feeders must hedge in the summer contracts, i.e., hedge 
with the June and August contracts. This implies that the squeeze 
analysis, as it applies to farmer-feeders, should be restricted to 
those summer contracts.
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the other hand, the feedlot-operator's yearly income is influenced by 
basis gains and losses associated with hedging in all six maturities.
The effects of one unusually wide basis could force the farmer-feeder, 
who is short in the market, out of business, while it would influence a 
relatively small (one-sixth) proportion of a large feedlot-operator's in­
come.
Frequent hedgers, who generally are large, would also seem to be in 
a better position to avoid or anticipate the effects of an aberrant basis 
than the smaller-farmer hedgers. By taking frequent positions in the market, 
these large hedgers gain invaluable market experience. Undoubtedly, it 
takes a lot of knowledge and practical experience in the live cattle market 
to make hedging pay. Therefore, experienced hedgers might have been able 
to anticipate, and hence avoid, situations that might not have been as ob­
vious to less experienced hedgers.
In summary, the empirical results strongly suggest that many hedgers 
failed to "lock in" an anticipated return when 14 of 78 contracts were 
used, although short hedgers would have benefited from IQ of these cases. 
Thus, while (short) hedging use appears relatively large, basis risk may 
have discouraged the smaller producers from short hedging and meatpackers 
and food retailers from long hedging.
III. PRICE BEHAVIOR OVER THE LIFE OF THE CONTRACT
The idea that price changes are random in efficient financial markets 
existed at the turn of the century. A Frenchman, Louis Bachelier, developed 
a mathematical theory to explain why changes in stock prices are random, 
but the significance of Bachelier’s work was largely unrecognized until 
Holbrook Working (1934) and Maurice Kendall (1953) analyzed stock and com­
modity prices.
If market prices follow a random walk, the presumption is that the 
market is efficient. Fama (1970) has categorized efficient markets by 
their ability to use existing information. His categories are weak, semi­
strong, and strong form efficiency. The weak form of the efficient market 
hypothesis states that current prices reflect all the information embodied 
in historical prices. Since truly new information occurs randomly, price 
changes occur randomly, and old information (reflected in historical prices) 
is useless for predicting future price changes. Hence, tests of weak-form 
efficiency rely only on historical prices.
The semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis states that 
market traders base their expectations on all available public information 
(e.g., Leuthold and Hartmann 1981), while the strong form of the efficient 
market hypothesis posits that avoidable error doesn’t exist in the market­
place. For strong-form efficiency to exist, no trader can have a monopoly 
on information; all public and private information is used in price forma­
tion. Individual traders cannot consistently outperform the market, al­
though unavoidable pricing errors will occur because truly new information 
cannot be anticipated.
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The purpose of this section is to appraise the forward-pricing 
efficiency of the live cattle contract. As suggested in the first sec­
tion, some critics believe that futures prices have been biased downward.
A forward-pricing (weak-form efficiency) model is used to analyze whether 
or not futures prices are unbiased estimates of maturity month prices. If 
historical price changes are indeed random, then a market is considered 
weak-form efficient. But this model cannot distinguish between avoidable 
and unavoidable error if prices are found to have been biased. The theo­
retical underpinnings of the random walk or, more broadly, the martingale 
model are discussed next. The subsequent subsection examines the methodology 
used by several researchers in papers evaluating the forward-pricing effi­
ciency of livestock futures. Ways to improve upon past methodologies are 
considered and incorporated into the forward-pricing models to be fitted 
in this chapter. Finally, the empirical results drawn from this forward- 
pricing model are analyzed.
Random Walk Concept
The random walk can be symbolized by
(1) p t ■ P„ . + e„,t“l t
where P represents price in period t and is an observation from the
same price series i periods earlier. The error term (e ) is assumed to 
have a constant variance through time (i.e., to be homoscedastic) and to 
be uncorrelated with error terms from previous time periods. The mean of 
the error term is zero.18/
Equation (1) can be rewritten as
(2) Pt P .t-1 £t *
This equation conveniently highlights an important result of the random 
walk theory: expected price changes are equal to zero since the expected 
value of e is zero and these price changes are not autocorrelated.
Of course, market imperfections exist; it is commonly assumed that 
the market can immediately adjust to new information but, in practice, 
several days may be required before the market has fully taken new infor­
mation into account. Hence, some degree of autocorrelation might be ex­
pected for short-term price changes, i.e., daily price changes.
18/ The critical martingale assumptions are that the price changes have 
a constant expected value and that the error terms are not auto­
correlated. Technically this does not require that the successive 
price changes have a constant variance as maturity approaches, and 
Samuelson (1976) has hypothesized that the variance of price changes 
increases as maturity approaches. For the purpose of exposition, 
however, it is convenient to talk in terms of a random walk.
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In addition, some analysts (Keynes 1930; Stein 1981) have argued that' 
hedgers "pay" speculators to accept risk. Thus, if a market were dominated 
by short hedgers who wish to avoid downward price risk, prices would be 
biased downward, but the empirical evidence does not fully support this 
notion (see Gray 1961; Houthakker 1957; Dusak 1973; Telser 1967). It is 
also possible in principle, though it seems unlikely in fact, that a mar­
ket consistently undervalues (or overvalues) a particular type of informa­
tion. This could lead to bias, and Helmuth (1981) argues that the dominance 
of short hedging and the importance of insider trading may bias cattle 
prices downward.
It is not necessary, however, that each trader possess the same in­
formation to make the market efficient. To the contrary, the diversity of 
information available to traders imparts randomness to the market. Fre­
quently, short-run fluctuations in futures prices result from such diversity. 
Working (1958) puts this phenomenon into perspective:
The amount of pertinent information potentially available to 
traders in most modern markets is far beyond what any one 
trader can acquire and use to good effect. Circumstances 
and inclination lead different traders to seek out and use 
different sorts of available information; and if at any 
time some sort of available and useful information is being 
generally neglected, someone is likely soon to discover that 
that neglect offers him a profitable field to exploit. In 
short, traders are forced and induced to engage in a sort of 
informal division of labor in their use of available informa­
tion. Using different information, traders must find them­
selves often in different opinion, one buying at the same time 
that another is selling, even though all may stand at an equal 
high level of intelligence, steadiness of judgement, and 
quality of information at their command.
Forward-Pricing Model
The forward-pricing (weak-form) efficiency of a particular market is 
often analyzed by making the cash or futures price at contract maturity a 
function of previous futures lagged i periods before the delivery month.
(3)  P. = ct. . + 3. . P _  . +Jt ji Ji Jt-i jt 
where P = futures prices,
t = 1, 2, ..., T years, 
i = 1, 2, ..., I monthly lags,
j =1, 2, ..., J contracts.
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For a given i and j each equation is assumed to be subject to the classical 
OLS assumptions, over T observations. The notion behind this model for 
testing bias is simple: if the slope coefficient (B.^) is one, the inter­
cept term (a..) is zero, and the error term (e^) is^not autocorrelated, 
then the market is efficient. 'jf
Leuthold (1974) uses a model like the one represented in equation (3) 
to test the pricing performance of the live cattle contract. He compares 
the forward-pricing efficiency of the live cattle contract (representing 
a nonstorable commodity) to that of the corn futures contract (representing 
a storable commodity). This was accomplished by regressing pooled closing 
futures prices on monthly futures prices for eight lagged periods (i.e., 
the data are not disaggregated as in (3)). Leuthold’s data consisted of 
36 live cattle contracts maturing from April 1965 through February 1971 and 
35 corn contracts maturing from 1964 through 1970. The dependent variable 
for each equation represented the second-to-last trading day's closing 
price. The explanatory variable represents the closing futures price that 
is closest to the 15th of the "regression" month. The OLS results for 
several of the cattle equations are reproduced below,
Leuthold found that the cattle and corn regression schemes yielded 
remarkably similar results. Both regression models showed that live cattle 
futures and corn futures are efficient for short time lags, but not for 
long lags.
Aggregation problem
There are at least three undesirable side effects of pooling data in 
the foregoing model. Pooling data (a) may give misleading increases in 
regression t-ratios, (b) thereby exaggerating aberrant observations, and 
(c) assume, perhaps incorrectly, that the contract's pricing performance 
does not vary seasonally or cyclically. Because of these problems, the 
decision was made to use disaggregated data for the forward-pricing analysis. 
The problems associated with pooling versus using disaggregated data are 
discussed below.
The (desired) effect of pooling data is to increase degrees of freedom, 
but the pooled prices are not independent drawings from the population of 
prices. A problem arises to the degree that the added observations contain 
little or no new information (i.e., are redundant). The result of pooling 
redundant observations is large t-ratios, biased towards rejecting null 
hypotheses. This point can be illustrated by a simple example. If the 
sample observations are 1, 2,' and 3, the sample mean is 2, and its standard 
deviation is 0.58. The computed t-ratio, under the null hypothesis that 
the true mean is zero, is 3.45. If another sample consists of the very same 
observations and if these two samples are pooled, the mean of the new sample 
(of six observations) is still 2, but its standard error is 0.36. Accord­
ingly, the t-ratio is 5.56. The results from pooling are, of course, 
appropriate if the second set of observations was an independent drawing 
from the same population. But, if the second set of observations are merely 
redundant, then the t-ratio of 5.56 exaggerates the statistical signifi­
cance of the results. Pooling futures prices for different contract 
maturities of the same commodity contain an element of this problem, as 
the prices for the different contracts respond to the same information in 
about the same way.
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A second, but related, problem is that market errors, whether avoid-" 
able or unavoidable, also tend to be imparted to the entire constellation 
of prices. For example, the effects of wage and price controls in the 
summer of 1973 can be seen in the entire constellation of futures prices 
for live cattle. Thus, in general, an aberration is likely to occur in 
the six (or more) price series for the contracts being traded at the time 
the event occurred. Such an aberration, combined with the t-ratio effect 
discussed above, can result in the conclusion that futures prices provide 
significantly biased estimates of maturity-time prices, when in fact they 
do not. If the price series contains unavoidable errors, such as those im­
parted by wage and price controls, and if the weak-form efficiency tests 
involve pooling, clearly erroneous conclusions could be drawn about possible 
market inefficiencies.
Third, when pooling data, one has to assume that the live cattle con­
tract's pricing performance does not vary seasonally or with respect to dif­
ferent segments of the cattle cycle. Martin and Garcia (1981) hypothesized 
that the forward-pricing performance is more accurate when the general 
level of beef prices is trending upward than when trending downward. They 
reason that more uncertainty surrounds the liquidation of cattle inven­
tories during a cycle than when there is an accumulation of inventories. 
Hence, this affects the forward-pricing performance of the contract.
Because of the potential problems of pooling, our econometric analysis 
relies on disaggregated data to measure contract performance. Each forward­
pricing equation regresses a delivery month futures price on one lagged 
futures price. There are four forward-pricing equations associated with 
the February contract (i.e., j = 1 and i = 2, 4, 6, 8 in equation 3), the 
April contract, and so on. Thus, there is just one observation per variable 
per year.
There is, however, a major disadvantage to disaggregating the data 
used in the forward-pricing regressions: few degrees of freedom. For
example, only 13 contract years (i.e., 1969-81) are analyzed in this study. 
Thus, each forward-pricing equation is estimated with just 11 degrees of 
freedom, but this is a realistic measure of the information content of the 
sample. If the variance of the hypothesized population— the random walk 
equation— is large, then a particular small sample could give estimates 
for forward-pricing equations that are quite different from their hypoth­
esized values. Therefore, one must interpret the results from the forward­
pricing estimates with caution. The only solution to this degrees-of- 
freedom problem is to let time pass so that the analysis can be done over 
a larger number of observations.
Contemporaneous covariance problem
The OLS regression framework, typically used by analysts, may not be 
appropriate for handling futures price data. The residuals across the 
forward pricing equations are perhaps correlated, and if this is so and 
if the explanatory variable for the equations differ, as they do in this 
application, then the OLS estimator would not be efficient (Zellner 1962).
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If the November cattle-on-feed report contained surprising "news," 
futures prices will change. This ’’news11 is incorporated into the December 
price of the February futures (i.e., Pit-2^* kut cou^dn,t ^ave been used 
in prior observations on February futures in October, August, or June 
(i.e., P- ,, plt_6> and pit„8» respectively). This suggests that the 
error terms for these February regressions have a common component. In 
general since new market information is imparted to the entire constella­
tion of futures prices (Tomek and Gray 1970), the residuals across equa­
tions likely are related. The error terms for different contracts have 
certain time intervals in common. For example, the August and June con­
tracts with eight month lag lengths span a common six month period, and 
these two equations have residuals with common elements.
Model specification
Price changes are unpredictable for a price series that follows a 
random walk. To emphasize this point, a variant of equation (3) is intro­
duced, viz.
(4) P..It P . . = a . ,  + 6 , .P . . . + e . ,Jt-i Ji Ji Jt-i Jit
where P. = (nominal) futures price for the first trading day in the delivery J t month,
P.jt-i futures price on or closest to the 15th day of the t-i pre­delivery month,19/
t = 1, 2, ... 13 (T) years,20/ 
i = 2, 4, 6, 8 (I) monthly lags, 
j = l ,  2, ... 6 (J) contracts.
Changes in futures prices, not changes in cash prices, are explained 
by lagged futures. Cash prices could have been used, but with a variety 
of par delivery points the identification of an appropriate spot price 
series is not obvious. Nominal prices are used under the assumption that 
the market should accurately forecast inflation up to eight months in 
advance.
Using the random walk model as a norm, this forward-pricing model says 
that futures price changes should not be predictable from the level of
19/ The price is assumed to be representative of prices discovered that 
month. Note that t = 2 implies a six week lag, etc.
20/ The data set used for the forward pricing model consists of all those 
~~~ futures contracts that matured between January 1, 1969 (i.e., t=l) and 
December 31, 1981 (i.e., t=13). The January contracts traded during 
this period of time were excluded from the data set.
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prices. The null hypothesis for an efficient market formally is
E [P , -P . .It jt-r P. . ] = 1 t-i
where E is the expectation operator. If this hypothesis is rejected, then 
separate tests for market bias and inefficiency would be appropriate, i.e,, 
the respective simple null hypothesis would then be «_,_.=() and <5 _._.=() (Mincer 
and Zarnowitz 1969). Jt Ji
Equation (4) is fitted 24 (Jxl) times by OLS, then the OLS regressions 
are repeated with observations deleted to take into account the wage and 
price controls of 1973,
Correlation coefficient tables are constructed for the OLS regressors 
and residuals across equations. These tables indicate whether or not the 
OLS structure is an appropriate framework for estimating these forward­
pricing equations. If the residuals, but not regressors, are highly 
correlated across equations then the OLS estimator is no longer asymptot­
ically efficient. This implies that Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated 
regression estimator (SUR) should be used (provided that the residuals 
are not autocorrelated).
Results and Appraisal
The results, using OLS and SUR estimators, are given in this section. 
These estimators were applied to the original data set and one that had 
deleted observations.21/
OLS results
A striking aspect of the estimated equations is the consistent negative 
signs of the slope coefficients and positive values of the intercept co­
efficients. The OLS regression results appear in Tables 11-14. Hypothesis 
testing notwithstanding, this pattern of negative slope coefficients, taken 
at face value, suggests that some market bias did exist. This so-called 
"bias" tends to get larger with longer lags. Furthermore, the results 
appear to follow a seasonal pattern; "bias" is most evident in the April 
and June contracts while virtually nonexistent in the October contract.22/
Interpreting the t-ratios is a little more difficult. The t-ratios 
for most equations are rather small (between one and two), but usually get 
larger with longer lags. A preliminary and superficial conclusion would be 
that the cattle market is inefficient, at least over long time intervals.23/
21/ The August 1973 through June 1974 observations were deleted from the 
data set. In preliminary tests, all the observations representing 
1973 and 1974 were deleted before OLS estimation. However, dropping 
the additional year’s observations had little effect on the results.
22/ This empirical fact argues against pooling contracts with similar lags.
23/ We shall argue, however, that these results also can be consistent with 
a (weak-form) efficient market.
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Table 11. Forward-pricing
1969-81
equations for contracts with a two-month lag.
Contract
OLS SUR
intercept slope — 2a/ D , W ^ intercept slope
February 6.76 , -0.15 0.17 1.56 15.815 -0.36
(1.79)- (1.86) (4.79) (5.24)
April 4.88 -0.10 0.05 2.42 13.08 -0.29
(1.28) (1.26) (4.22) (4.44)
June 6.62 -0,14 0.08 3.22 16.67 -0.35
(1.37) (1.42) (4.14) (4.42)
August 6.19 0.13 0.00 1.81 15.37 -0.33
(0.96) (0.97) (3.22) (3.45)
October 2.58 -0.06 -0.08 1.83 14.98 -0.33
(0.38) (0.40) (2.54) (2.69)
December 3.53 -0.09 0.03 1.73 10.28 -0.24
(0.94) (1.20) (3.34) (3.83)
Pooled 5.11 -0.11 0.08 16.07 -0.35
(2.67) (2.81) (9.65) (10.26)
See Table 14 for notes.
Table 12. Forward-pricing equations for contracts with a four-month lag,
1969-81
OLS SUR
Contract intercept slope ¥ 2a/ D.wl/ intercept slope
February 9.38 p/ -0.21 0.19 1.32 20.66 -0.47
(1.91)— (1.94) (5.22) (5.56)
April 9.08 -0.18 0.13 1.81 19.66 -0.42
(1.80) (1.69) (5.21) (5.45)
June 11.00 -0.21 0.12 2.71 24.52 -0.50
(1.74) (1.60) (5.08) (5.25)
August 9.52 -0,22 0.09 2.26 20.83 -0.46
(1.34) (1-50) (4.14) (4.70)
October 1.02 0.04 -0.08 2.38 7.93 -0,16
(0.21) (0.35) (1.82) (1.77)
December 7.75 -0.18 0.05 1.32 15.21 -0.35
(1.13) (1.30) (2.72) (3.05)
Pooled 7.91 -0.17 0.13 21.65 -0.47
(3.44) (3.47) (11.37) (12.02)
See Table 14 for notes.
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Table 13. Forward-pricing 
1969-81
equations for contracts with a six-month lag,
OLS SUR
Contract intercept slope R2— / D.wl' intercept slope
February 12.06 , -0.27 0.20 1.18 23.09 -0.52
(1.94)— (1-98) (4.51) (4.81)
April 10.88 -0.22 0.11 1.50 21.96 -0.47
(1.73) (1.58) (4.72) (4.87)
June 12.57 -0.22 0.14 2.31 25.65 -0.51
(2.04) (1.71) (5.49) (5.43)
August 8.37 -0.18 0.11 2.76 18.31 -0.39
(1.51) (1.56) (4.50) (4.91)
October 2.78 -0.07 -0.06 2.97 13.81 -0.31
(0.51) (0.59) (2.88) (3.12)
December 3.21 -0.07 -0.03 2.09 10.18 -0.22
(0.82) (0.82) (3.04) (3.20)
Pooled 8.54 -0.17 0.14 21.96 -0.47
(3.82) (3.68) (11.88) (12.39)
See Table 14 for notes.
Table 14. Forward-pricing equations for contracts 1with an eight-month lag,
1969-81
OLS SUR
Contract intercept slope R2— / D.W.-^ intercept slope
February 8.58 , -0.17 0.09 1.53 19.70 -0.43
(1.68)— (1.49) (4.64) (4.64)
April 15.24 -0.31 0.17 1.56 24.79 -0.53
(1.94) (1.85) (4.23) (4.39)
June 14.64 -0.26 0.15 2.00 27.04 -0.54
(2.08) (1.76) (4.93) (4.83)
Augus t 10.05 -0.19 0.14 2.08 20.34 -0.42
(1.88) (1.71) (4.82) (4.90)
October 5.38 -0.12 -0.02 2.55 17.91 -0.39
(0.83) (0.87) (3.25) (3.47)
December 6.28 -0.15 0.08 2.72 13.18 -0.30
(1.22) (1.42) (2.88) (3.21)
Pooled 10.26 -0.21 0.16 23.65 -0.51
(4.20) (3.96) (11.62) (11.94)
a/ R-squared adjusted for degrees of freedom. b/ Durbin-Watson statistic
c/ Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
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Some large price changes can occur, however, which the market cannot 
predict, such as the effect of red meat wage and price controls in 1973-74, and 
the observations associated with this episode were deleted (illustrated in 
Tables 15-16). These deletions, however, had little affect on the esti­
mated forward-pricing equations, Chronic underestimation persists whether 
or not deletions were made. To understand why, the observations used for 
estimating the June forward-pricing model with a six month lag are pre­
sented in Figure 2. As suspected, the 1974 observation has a large error, 
but the effect on the coefficients is small because this outlier is roughly 
in the middle of the data.
Other "outliers" exist in this particular data set. For example, 
visual inspection indicates that the 1978 and 1980 observations have large 
errors. These apparent outliers may have been caused by market uncertainties 
surrounding inflationary expectations 24/ and the cattle cycle.25/ When the 
June model was reestimated with the 1974, 1978, and 1980 points deleted, the 
t-ratios were much smaller (Table 17). Clearly the regression results are 
sensitive to "aberrant" observations in a small sample.
Unfortunately, a strong justification does not exist for dropping the 1978 
and 1980 observations. Furthermore, visual inspection of the data suggests 
that the pattern of observable outliers changes over lagged contracts, al­
though the August 1973-June 1974 observations consistently appeared to be 
aberrant. The results, however, emphasize the importance of individual ob­
servations in determining coefficients in a small sample.
The general null hypothesis introduced above was, however, founded on 
the idea that price levels should not be able to forecast subsequent price 
changes. In light of the evidence obtained so far, formal hypothesis testing 
procedures can help determine whether or not P. can accurately forecast 
P. - P. .. (EL: E[P. - P.j.  ^j P-t = 0.)3tlf these tests produce 
r4iativ45y1low test stillistitls, 1theA one is led to believe that futures 
price changes are unpredictable. On the other hand, high test statistics 
are further evidence that the market is inefficient.
The information appearing in Tables 11-14 suggests that the October 
contract would be least likely, of all the contracts, to be biased, while 
the April and June contracts would be most likely to be biased. In Appendix 
C test statistics are calculated for the October contract with a two month 
lag and the April and June contract with eight month lags. 26/ None of 
the calculated test statistics turned out to be "significantly" large. In 
fact, they are surprisingly low, and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
even using large levels of Type I error.
The results presented up to this point perhaps appear to be contra­
dictory, but before considering the interpretation in detail, we examine 
the SUR results. This framework is logically more correct.
24/ Inflation in the U.S. was at its zenith during the late 1970s.
25/ The cattle cycle was completing its liquidation phase in the late 1970s.
26/ The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic varies across equation. The DW 
statistic for these three equations is reasonably close to two.
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Table 15. Forward-pricing equations with a two-month lag, 1969-81, 
with one observation deleted a/
Contract
OLS SUR
intercept slope r 26/ intercept slope
February 6-53 c/ -0.15 0.19 13,73 -0.32(1.73)- (1.88) (4.69) (5.20)
April 5.01 -0.09 0.04 12.08 -0.25
(1-38) (1.23) (3.93) (3.95)
June 7.49 -0.14 0.14 14.72 -0.29
(1.80) (1-69) (3.87) (3.87)
Augus t 5.65 -0.13 0.00 12.49 -0.28
(0.90) (1.02) (2.56) (2.87)
October 1.16 0.00 oi—io1 10.15 -0.20
(0.20) (0.01) (2.16) (2.07)
December 4.03 -0.09 0.08 9.27 -0.20
(1.31) (1.40) (3.30) (3.54)
See Table 16 for notes.
Table 16. Forward-pricing equations with an eight-month lag, 1969-•81,
with one observation deleted a/
OLS SUR
Contract intercept slope ¥ 2b/ intercept slope
February 8.58 , -0.17 0.09 16.80 -0.37
(1.61)— (1-44) (4.01) (4.05)
April 12.99 -0.24 0.09 22.42 -0.46
(1.75) (1-43) (3.98) (3.83)
June 14.45 -0.23 0.16 24.82 -0.47
(2.35) (1.77) (4.73) (4.26)
August 7.47 o1 0.20 14.65 -0.32
(1.85) (1.91) (4.13) (4.39)
October 5.51 -0.12 -0.03 14.99 -0.33
(0.80) (0.84) (2.78) (3.01)
December 6.86 -0.16 0.09 13.57 -0.30
(1.30) (1*44) (2.79) (3.04)
a/ See text for explanation.
b/ R-squared adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
c/ Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
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Table 17. Estimates of June forward-pricing equation, six month lag, 
for various samples
Sample intercept slope jib!
1969-81 12.57 , 
(2.04)-
-0.22
(1.71)
0.14
1969-81; 74 deleted 13.00
(2.40)
-0.21
(1.82)
0.17
1969-81; 74, 78, 80 deleted 7.39
(1.75)
-0.09
(0.92)
-0.02
a/ Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
b/ Adjusted for degrees of freedom.
SUR results
A difficulty with using the SUR framework is the inescapable degrees- 
of-freedom problem. There are 13 observations per equation and 24 equations 
in the system. Mathematically, it is impossible to use the SUR estimator 
for a system of equations if the number of observations is smaller than the 
total number of equations.
The SUR framework, however, can be applied to a subset of equations, 
i.e., those equations that have the most highly correlated residuals. It 
appears from Table 18 that the blocks of equations along the main diagonal 
of the matrix of residuals have the highest correlation coefficients.
These are the four equations for a given contract with differing lags.
Also, the explanatory variables in these blocks of equations are not per­
fectly correlated, i.e., they are indeed different (Table 19) . 27/ Thus, it 
seems reasonable to use the SUR framework for the subsystems of equations, 
one four equation system per contract.
The results from these equations are placed next to the OLS results 
in Tables 11-16. The prima facie results of the SUR equations follow the 
same sort of pattern found in the OLS results; however, the degree of "bias" 
is much more pronounced in the estimated coefficients and t-ratios.
In addition, aggregating data tends to accentuate estimated forward­
pricing bias. The pooled contracts that were estimated by OLS suggest more 
bias in price performance than the individual lagged contracts. Furthermore, 
the combined consequences of aggregation and SUR estimation are to accen­
tuate estimated bias, what one would expect if the SUR estimation of aggre­
gated models were appropriate.
27/ The fact that the regressors for most of these equations are highly 
correlated suggests that SUR may not be much more efficient than OLS 
(Zellner 1962).
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Again, based on the arguments given above, the general null hypothesis 
is tested for the same equations that were tested in Appendix C. However, 
a variant of the conventional test statistic is used, since each equation 
tested is part of a larger system of equations (Johnston 1972). As in 
the OLS case, none of the calculated test statistics turn out to be sig­
nificantly large. Thus, the live cattle market appears to be efficient 
in the sense that the hypothesis that the conditional mean of the price 
change is zero cannot be rejected.
Interpreting results
In interpreting results, two ideas should be kept in mind: first,
the sample period is short and the observations for the different contracts 
and lags are not independent of each other. Second, the hypothesis that 
the conditional mean of the price change is zero is a different hypothesis 
than that the individual parameters are zero. The more general hypothesis 
is whether the price level has predictive power or not.
With respect to the first concept, the 24 equations help describe the 
sample, but they do not provide 24 times more information than if one had 
fitted a single equation. In this context, one should expect the observed 
internal consistency of regression results— the positive intercepts and the 
negative slopes, the seasonal pattern of results, the pattern associated 
with lags, the effect of aggregation, and the effect of SUR. These all 
are a part of the interrelated prices and pricing errors in a sample from 
a 13-year period.
Moreover, an implication of the coefficients of determination being 
small is that the residual errors are large relative to the variance of 
price changes. In terms of the random walk equation, the variance of the 
errors may be sufficiently large so that a particular small sample (like 
the one used in this study) could give an intercept and a slope quite dif­
ferent from zero. Conceptually, if this same 13-year sample period could be 
replicated with the same (large) error term, quite different price observa­
tions would likely occur.
The larger t-ratios for the individual coefficients in the equations 
with the longer time lags also could be consistent with an underlying random 
walk price behavior. In a random walk, the longer the time interval over 
which prices are allowed to change, the larger the variance of the price 
change. Given any initial price and a (fixed) variance of daily price 
changes, a price series has more scope to wander over eight months (160 
days) than over two months (40 days). In a 13-year sample, we have 13 
initial prices (P, .’s), which vary from year to year. In a particular
year, it is quite^possible that a high initial price is associated with a 
subsequent large price deer ease or that a low initial price is associated 
with a large price increase, when eight months are allowed for prices to 
change. A few observations like this, in the context of 13 observations, 
could result in a slope and an intercept significantly different than zero. 
This is less probable in an equation with a two-month lag, because the 
variance of the dependent variable is smaller than for an eight-month lag.
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The empirical results obtained in this study could, of course, have been 
generated by an inefficient market, but since the hypothesis that the con­
ditional mean of the price change is zero cannot be rejected, the evidence 
favors weak-form market efficiency even for the equations with long time 
lags. We turn next to further discussion of the hypothesis tests.
After inspecting the regression results, it is clear that this study's 
overall sample estimate may be characterized by the line drawn in Figure 3. 
In this figure, the horizontal axis represents the hypothesized population, 
i.e., the efficient market hypothesis. The broken line with the nonzero 
slope represents the estimated relation. The negative slope coefficient 
implies that the intercept coefficient could not equal zero. But this re­
sult can be consistent with the null hypothesis that the conditional mean 
of the price change is zero, where the conditioning prices are within the 
range of the sample data. This would be true if the variance of the forward 
pricing equation is large.
Thus, the hypotheses about the individual parameters differ from the 
one about a conditional mean. The hypothesis that the intercept coefficient 
equals zero is interesting by itself if the slope coefficient equals zero; 
in this case the simple hypothesis would test for bias. But, if the slope 
coefficient differs from zero, the test of the intercept being zero (as a 
simple single hypothesis) is misleading, because this is equivalent to 
testing that the price change is zero when the price level is zero— not a 
meaningful question. Rather, one should see if the estimated price change 
is significantly different from zero within the range of observed prices.
The (general) hypothesis of a zero price change cannot be rejected. In 
other words, the equations are not profitable forecasters, and, in this 
sense, the market is efficient.
Putting the Results into Perspective
Our results suggest why past empirical measures of the efficient market 
hypothesis have been mixed. The efficient market theory holds only on 
average. This implies that a fair test of this conjecture requires many 
observations. Unfortunately, the relatively recent creation of the live 
cattle contract has precluded such a mature price series. Instead, past 
efficient-market studies have had to rely upon a short sample from a period 
with highly variable prices. Hence, the empirical results have been greatly 
influenced by a particular sample period's anomalies.
Given the inadequacies of a small sample, it is important to use the 
correct methodology when testing the efficient market hypothesis. A 
methodology that relies on pooled data multi-counts redundant and, per­
haps aberrant, information and, hence, is more likely to reject the effi­
cient market hypothesis. Also, the use of different hypothesis test pro­
cedures may account for some of the differences in conclusions among studies
Table 20 was constructed to show whether or not the live cattle con­
tracts forecasting performance have changed from the time of Leuthold's 
(1974) study. Leuthold hypothesized that the contract's forecasting per­
formance would improve as volume of trading and liquidity in the live cattle
A3
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market increased. The pooled regression results are placed next to 
selected results from Leuthold's study. Therefore, the only difference 
in methodology between the two studies is the sample period used. 
(Leuthold's sample covered a period of time from 1965 through 1971.)
The live cattle contract in the more recent sample is perhaps more 
efficient than it was in Leuthold's (1974) earlier sample. Although1 the 
t-ratios for the coefficients of the models estimated over the more recent 
sample period tend to be larger, the intercept coefficients are somewhat 
closer to zero as are the slope coefficients. The larger t-ratios may have 
been caused by the' larger number of observations used in our pooled re­
gressions .
The live cattle futures contract has, historically, had the tendency 
to systematically underestimate actual futures prices— especiaJly for those 
discovered away from the nearby delivery months. Still, the pitfalls 
associated with using pooled data preclude one from drawing strong infer­
ences from the evidence presented in Table 20.
Table 20. Comparing forward-pricing equations for pooled data, 
various time lags
Lag-
months prior 
to maturity
Leutholda/ this study
intercept slope intercept slope R2t/
2 1.69 , 
(0.43)— 7
0.04
(0.25)
5.11
(2.67)
-0.11
(2.81)
0.08
4 10.32
(2.10)
-0.35
(1.92)
7.91
(3.44)
-0.17
(3.47)
0.13
6 17.18
(2.98)
-0.59
(2.80)
8.54
(3.82)
-0.17
(3.68)
0.14
8 21.04
(3.25)
-0.74
(3.10)
10.26
(4.20)
-0.21
(3.96)
0.16
a_/ Slopes computed by subtracting 1 from original estimates in Leuthold 
(1974), and t-ratio based on slope = zero.
bj Adjusted for degrees of freedom.
oj Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
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A priori, one would think that the results derived from this study 
should be in closer agreement with those found in Martin and Garcia's 
(1981) paper. This is because (a) both studies used disaggregated data, 
and (b) both studies used data from a more similar time period. And, in­
deed, the results are similar.
This report's empirical findings and those of the aforementioned 
papers conclude that, during the period 1965-81, when la.gged futures prices 
fell below their historical mean, delivery month futures prices were under­
estimated, and vice versa if they were greater than their mean. Indeed, if 
the results are viewed as descriptive statistics, this is the nature of 
the sample period. However, from a forecasting standpoint, the estimated 
forward-pricing models are poor predictors of future price changes.28/ One 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the conditional mean of price changes 
is zero. In this sense, the market was a fair game. Or put differently, 
knowing the price level "today," one cannot make an accurate or profitable 
forecast of a price change.
IV. SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Summary
The purpose of this study was to describe the performance of the live 
cattle contract through an empirical analysis of basis behavior in the de­
livery month and price behavior over the life of the contract. Descriptive 
statistics and regression techniques were used in the evaluation of contract 
performance. The sample period used in this study represented prices dis­
covered from 1969 through 1981.
The success of a futures contract can be gauged by its use for hedging. 
The evidence shows that large hedgers were quite active on the short side 
of the market during the late-1970s and early-1980s. However, long hedging 
was relatively small. This may be due to (a) institutional disincentives 
(e.g., direct marketing, formula pricing, etc.) faced by meatpackers and 
(b) a lack of hedging experience in the food retail industry. Nevertheless, 
large (short) hedgers appeared to have used the market because it is profit­
able for them to do so.
Unfortunately, few statistics exist on small hedger usage of the live 
cattle contract. Surveys (Leuthold 1975; Helmuth 1977) have found that few 
farmer-feeders use the contract. Helmuth (1981) conjectures that relatively 
few small feeders can lock in a profitable futures market hedge, but Hayenga 
et al. (1983) found that profitable hedging opportunities have existed.
28/ Martin and Garcia (1981) did suggest that the seasonal pattern of results 
implies some market bias associated with seasonality of cattle marketings 
and of volume of trading in cattle futures. Logically, however, little 
reason exists for a market to have varying degrees of efficiency related 
to a particular contract maturity, and unpublished results for other 
commodities in work by Kahl and Tomek suggest a similar pattern of 'bias. 
Perhaps the events of the 1970 sample period imparted a similar pattern 
of errors to a variety of commodity prices. Until more data are available, 
we would be careful about reading too much into the seasonal pattern of 
coefficients.
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The analysis of basis behavior at contract maturity does give insight 
into basis risk for potential hedgers. Five cash prices were used in the 
analysis: Interior Iowa; Sioux City, Iowa; Omaha, Nebraska; East St. Louis,
Illinois; and Peoria, Illinois. Delivery-month bases were computed for 
these markets for six futures contracts over 13 years. The bases can be 
characterized as having different levels, but related changes. All were 
variable from year to year. But the East St. Louis bases were noticeably 
"different" from the rest; i.e., their level and variability were especially 
large.
A criterion developed for diagnosing a delivery month "squeeze" was 
based on identifying months where the futures price was "out of line" with 
most or all spot prices. After applying the criterion, 14 out of 78 con­
tracts (18 percent) appeared to have had anomalous bases. These bases were 
unexpectedly narrow for 10 of these 14 contracts, while the balance were 
unexpectedly wide. Furthermore, the aberrant size seemed to be associated 
with large daily variability within the month.
It appears that the short hedger could have benefited from the narrowing 
of basis in 10 of the 14 contracts identified as having aberrant behavior.
This is because the net return from the combined futures and spot trans­
actions is greater than the amount anticipated from using a normal (average) 
basis. In contrast, long hedgers would have been harmed. Perhaps this ex­
plains, in part, why the market has been unable to attract more long hedging. 
It does appear though that farmer-feeders could have profitably used the 
contract if they were experienced in hedging.
The effects of one unusually wide basis, however, could force a farmer- 
feeder , but probably not the large feedlot operator, out of business. One 
unusual basis would affect a relatively small proportion of a large operator’s 
income, but a relatively large proportion of a farmer-feeder's income. Thus, 
the potential for financial ruin from a hedge may discourage small producers, 
particularly those inexperienced in using futures, who might have been poten­
tial hedgers.
Could more market regulation be effective in curbing this sort of prob­
lem? Improvements in the contract may correct some potential squeeze in­
cidents, but probably not all of them. Also, the evidence does not support 
manipulation in the final few days of trading as a major problem. In this 
sense, regulation is.not the answer. Apparently the squeezes described above 
can be categorized as being "natural,"
Overall, the empirical results show that problems existed with 14 of 
78 live cattle contracts, but it would be an overstatement to say that this 
same ratio of contracts will experience problems in the future and will 
favor short hedging. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange appears to be sensi­
tive to the possibility of improving contract provisions, as evidenced by 
past changes.
The success of a futures contract can also be gauged by its ability 
to facilitate spot price discovery, i.e., its ability to provide an efficient 
forward-pricing mechanism. Hence, this report has attempted to evaluate the 
forward-pricing performance of the live cattle contract. Using a statistical 
model to explain the forward-pricing efficiency of the live cattle contract,
47
it was established that knowing the futures price level "today," the 
hypothesis that "tomorrowTs" price change is zero cannot be rejected.
This was true when "tomorrow" was defined in terms of lags from two to 
eight months. It is true, however, that the market made some large in­
dividual errors. Market prices six or more months before maturity have 
not been especially good guides to prices at maturity.
The analysis does provide insights into the use of futures prices in 
forward—pricing models. By definition, if the random variability is large 
relative to the systematic variability in the series, then the estimates of 
the systematic components can be widely different from one small sample to 
the next. This problem is not overcome by pooling prices from different 
contracts. A particular event is imparted to the entire constellation of 
prices, and pooling can exaggerate the effect of an aberration. In general, 
the pooled prices are not independent samples, but rather are highly re 
lated, thereby providing little additional information beyond that con­
tained in a particular disaggregated series.
Empirical Limitations
A weakness of the study of basis behavior in the delivery month is 
the reliance on an empirical rule of thumb. But such a rule had to be 
used since neither theory nor available data permit a precise definition 
of abnormal behavior. The difficulty of measuring "normal" basis behavior 
is obviously compounded when measuring "abnormal basis behavior. Thus, 
the conclusion that a "squeeze" occurred in 14 of the 78 months is based 
strictly on empirical analysis and not on a detailed analysis of the events 
surrounding each month.
fortunately, the methodology used to describe price behavior over the 
life of the contract is based more heavily on logic. The model is sug 
gested by the flow of information, and the methodological framework used 
in this study incorporates the use of the seemingly unrelated regression 
estimator and disaggregated data based on theoretical grounds. Yet, prob­
lems exist.
First, the SUR framework cannot be used for the entire 24 equation 
model. This is because there are too few observations. Hence, the system 
was divided into four equation subsystems, involving the four lag lengths 
for a contract. This approach does not take account of contemporaneous 
correlations across contracts. The only solution to this problem is to 
let time pass in order to have more observations.
Second, the small number of observations in the data set, by itself, 
makes it difficult to accurately estimate the forward-pricing equations.
The data set contains influential observations that have a strong effect on 
the regression results, but it is difficult to justify discarding particular 
data points. That is, it is difficult to discriminate between avoidable and 
unavoidable forward-pricing errors.
The residual errors were relatively large as compared with the variance 
of the price changes. Thus, these markets were categorized as being effi-^ 
cient, but perhaps an econometric model, using publicly available information 
could have explained these errors. If this were indeed the case, then the 
market is inefficient.
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But in all fairness to the contract, one has no proof, given the 
empirical results, that avoidable errors have characterized pricing in the 
market. The existence of such errors cannot be detected without additional 
analysis.
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
Our results suggest that the live cattle contract is partially ful­
filling its hedging function, while it is fulfilling a forward-pricing 
function. Hedgers have faced substantial basis risk at contract maturity, 
but this apparently has not precluded the use of the market by short hedgers. 
And, although some large individual forward-pricing errors have occurred, 
the evidence indicates that the live cattle market has been efficient on 
average. The final verdict on market performance, however, will require 
additional research.
Of the 78 delivery months studied, 14 had unusually large or small 
bases relative to the norm (averages) for the five cash markets used in 
our study. These particular months also were characterized by variable 
daily bases compared with the "typical" maturity month. These empirical 
results are historical facts, but they do not explain the anomalous behavior. 
Perhaps an econometric model could be developed to explain basis variability. 
Ideally, such a model would contain variables that can account for the ex­
ceptional behavior and perhaps be used to forecast future instances of such 
behavior.
Alternatively, a case study approach might be used. It would be use­
ful to know, for example, whether the months identified in this study as 
possible squeezes coincided with those identified by the industry or by 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as possible problem months. De­
pending on the availability of information, the case study approach may be 
more useful in identifying the sources of the observed behavior than an 
econometric model.
Clearly, if the basis at maturity is unexpectedly small or large or 
unusually variable, the value of the market for hedging is effected. Our 
research illustrates this point and also Indicates that short hedgers, such 
as farmers, would often have benefited from unexpectedly small bases. But 
more research needs to be done on the effects of basis instability on 
hedging strategies. It would be useful to know if one particular hedging 
strategy was superior to others or whether any are better than none at all. 
Further analysis also is needed on how basis risk may influence cattle 
producers of varying sizes and whether a formal forecasting model, such as 
the one proposed above, could reduce basis risk. Such analyses are needed 
before one can certify which groups, if any, are disadvantaged when hedging 
in the live cattle market.
The cattle market appears to have been weak-form efficient; that is, 
given an initial price within the range of historical observations, no 
statistical basis exists for forecasting a price change from this price 
level. Studies that have found "significant" bias usually have pooled 
redundant observations, which is a questionable methodology. The correct 
approach to weak-form tests would involve the fitting of individual equations 
to disaggregated observations by a seemingly unrelated regression technique.
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But there are typically too few degrees of freedom to fit a full SUR system. 
Moreover, results from small samples drawn from populations with highly 
variable prices are difficult to interpret. Thus, there are limits to the 
usefulness of weak-form analyses, and further exploration of semi-strong 
tests would be appropriate. Clearly markets— both futures and cash— make 
errors. These errors are often unavoidable, but if pricing errors have 
occurred that could have been avoided, this would be useful to know. Market 
performance can be improved by learning from past experiences.
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APPENDIX A
Trend Analysis of 30 Interyear Bases ($/cwt)
Market Contract Intercept Slope R2-/
Interior Iowa (1) Feb. 1.47 L/ 
(2.46)—
-0.09
(2.18)
0.22
Sioux City (2) Feb. 0.98
(0.12)
0.01
(0.15)
-0.08
Omaha (3) Feb. 0.97
(0.62)
-0.02
(0.40)
-0.07
East St, Louis (4) Feb. 0.51
(0.93)
0.07
(1.12)
0.02
Peoria (5) Feb, -0.20
(1.54)
0.06
(1.63)
0.11
(1) Apr. 1.07
(0.20)
0.03
(0.57)
-0.05
(2) Apr. 0.74
(1.85)
0.08
(2.37)
0.26
(3) Apr. 0.36
(1.87)
0.15
(2.12)
0.21
(4) Apr* 0.39
(2.40)
0.20
(2.70)
0.33
(5) Apr. -0.41
(3.32)
0.22
(3.54)
0.47
(1) June 0.67
(0.23)
0.02
(0.42)
-0.07
(2) June 0.15
(1.14)
0.08
(1.28)
0.05
(3) June 0.30
(0.99)
0.06
(1.16)
0.03
(4) June 0.49
(1.86)
0.17
(2.12)
0.22
(5) June -0.24
(2.29)
0.16
(2.43)
0.29
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APPENDIX A (continued)
Market Contract Intercept Slope r 2— 7
(1) Aug. 1.05
(0.85)
-0.06
(0.73)
-0.04
(2) Aug. 1.12
(0.57)
-0.08
(0.52)
-0.06
(3) Aug. 0.59
(0.77)
-0.06
(0.74)
-0.04
(4) Aug. 0.20
(2.07)
0.14
(2.31)
0.26
(5) Aug. -0.24
(1.16)
0.11
(1.22)
0.04
(1) Oct. 0.95
(1.29)
-0.05
(1.11)
0.02
(2) Oct. 0.46
(0.48)
0.03
(0.65)
-0.05
(3) Oct. 0,32
(0.20)
0.02
(0.31)
-0.08
(4) Oct. -0.57
(2.55)
0.13
(2.61)
0.33
(5) Oct. -1.04
(2.31)
0.17
(2.30)
0.26
(1) Dec. 1.83
(1.69)
-0.07
(1.32)
0.06
(2) Dec. 1.34
(0.03)
0.02
(0.40)
-0.08
(3) Dec. 1.42
(1.07)
-0.03
(0.71)
-0.40
(4) Dec. 0.75
(1.71)
0.16
(1.98)
0.21
(5) Dec. 0.24
(2.55)
0.14
(2.84)
0.37
a/ Adjusted for degrees of freedom.
b/ Numbers in parentheses represent t-ratios of attendant parameters
assuming Hq=0.
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APPENDIX B
Deliveries as a Percentage of Contract High Open Interest-
Futures Contracts
Year Feb. Apr. June Aug. Oct. Dec.
.
1969 2.85 2.42
AO
0.33 0.49 1.27 2.91
1970 0.88 1.15 0.78 4.09 2.59 3.70
1971 3.03 1.15 1.33 0.60 1.45 1.26
1972 0.14 0.79 1.20 0.29 0.16 6.94
1973 5.30 0.52 1.63 11.00 1.59 11.26
1974 5.68 3.48 3.59 5.70 1.98 3.88
1975 1.07 1.71 1.59 0.43 1.23 2.20
1976 0.47 4.43^ 10.10^ 3.7 <47 1.74-/ 1.45^
1977 0.00 1.92 1.90 0.51 0.54 0.35
1978 0.01 0.75 1.12 1.38 0.29 5.53
1979 2.37 1.98 0.78 2.39 9.07 3.96
1980 0.85 1.96 1.09 1.30 1.54 4.82
1981 6.87 5.99 5.49 2.75 3.36 2.81
a/ Delivery and open interest statistics taken from the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange Yearbook, various issues.
b/ Effective February 23, 1976, new contract definitions were introduced. 
Thus, trading occurred in both "old" and "new" contracts for the 
April through December 1976 maturities. Hence, a decision had to be 
made as to which open interest and delivery statistics would be used 
to compute the percentage in this cell. The denominator, open in­
terest, of this percentage was calculated by taking the "new" con­
tract’s high open interest and add to it the "old" contract’s open 
interest. The two open interest numbers came from the same trading 
day. Similarly, the numerator, deliveries, of this percentage was 
calculated by adding together the total number of deliveries on each 
contract.
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Test Statistics for the General Null Hypothesis
APPENDIX C
In section III, the general null hypothesis of an efficient market 
is a.. + 6..P. . = 0 .  The conditioning variable, P, is set at 60 dollarsji jt-i
per cwt, a value within the range of prices, but near the upper extreme. 
Test statistics are calculated for each general null hypothesis that uses 
OLS and SUR estimates from select equations. The statistics appear in 
Table Cl.
A test criterion was established for hypothesis testing and assuming 
a two-tail alternative hypothesis. Two critical values, one for the null 
hypothesis that dealt with OLS estimated equations and the other with SUR 
estimated equations, were established prior to hypothesis testing.
The first critical value was based on an arbitrary level of significance 
of 0.30, a relatively large level of type I error. Thus, the critical 
nt-valueM for the null hypothesis test is 1.09._
The second critical value is different from the one just described 
since a SUR equation is part of a system of equations. Johnston (1972, 
page 406) proposed a test statistic— Hotelling's T2 statistic— that can 
be used as a critical value. The square root of this statistic gives a 
critical nt-value" of 3.27 for the 25 percent level of significance (a con­
venient level for this computation). This number is derived from the fol­
lowing formula, which cannot be found directly in published tables.
T2 F r» - K>M ilN-K-M+lJ
where N = number of observations,
K = number of exogenous variables in the system,
M = number of equations, and
F = F-statistic for M and N-K-M+l degrees of freedom at the alpha 
level of significance.
When comparing the test statistics in Table Cl to the critical values, 
it is obvious that the general null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and 
varying the level of the conditioning price levels within the range of the 
sample would not change this conclusion.
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Table Cl. Selected test statistics
Contract-Lag__________Standard deviation (S) a/Test statistic—
r~~-- -— s---—-------- ----- — .■
V  Var(a)+pj . Var (5 )+2P . .Cov(a<5)jt-i jt-i
a + 6 P . , .j t-i
S
(a) OLS results
15.24-0.314(60)
3.734Apr.-8 ^  (61.60)+(60)2(0.029)+(2)(60)(-1.265)
14.64-0.263(60)
3.206June-8 ^  (49* 57)+(60)2(0.022)+(2)(60)(-0.996)
2.480-0.057(60)
2.302.Oct.-2 \J (45.78)+(60)2(0.020)+(2)(60)(-0,923)
(b) SUR results
24.79-0.533(60)
3.199Apr.-8 \J (34.41)+(60)2(Q.015)+(2)(60)(-0.643)
27.04-0.541(60)
2.826June-8 \1 (30.04)+(60)2(0.013)+(2)(60)(-0.559)
14.98-0.328(60)
2.598Oct.-2 \J (34.69)+(60)2(0.015)+(2)(60)(-0.680)
0.967
0.358
0.292
2.240
1.909
1.818
a./ Equality may not hold exactly because of rounding error; computations 
carried out to six places, but rounded to three.
